Heidegger, Hegel, Marx: Marcuse and the Theory of Historicity by Jeffry V. Ocay
 
 
 
KRITIKE   VOLUME TWO   NUMBER TWO   (DECEMBER 2008)  46-64 
 
 
© 2008 Jeffry V. Ocay 
http://www.kritike.org/journal/issue_4/ocay_december2008.pdf 
ISSN 1908-7330 
 
 
Article 
 
Heidegger, Hegel, Marx: 
Marcuse and the Theory of Historicity 
 
Jeffry V. Ocay 
 
 
he search for a historically conscious individual who is disposed to 
“radical action” is the main thrust of this paper.  This is premised on 
the following claims: first, that the modern society is a pathological 
society whose rules, most often but not necessarily, imply control and 
domination; thus a “refusal” to abide by these rules is the most appropriate 
alternative available; and, second, that there is still hope for the 
Enlightenment’s project of emancipation, that is, such “refusal,” which means 
a political fight for liberation, is still winnable no matter how formidable the 
forces of domination may be.  But this paper can only do so much. I do not 
offer any universal and prefab solution to the pathological society. What I do 
instead is argue that the emergence of a historically conscious individual who is 
disposed to “radical action,” which eventually leads to a “collective radical 
action,” is still possible today.  I also argue that “radical action” presupposes an 
awareness of the concrete socio-historical situations, thus the importance of 
“historicity.”  This is done through a reconstructive reading of Marcuse’s 
Critical Theory.  In fact, my argument is just an echo on what Marcuse did 
more than four decades ago. 
The paper starts with a brief discussion on “historicity” and the 
background of Marcuse’s conception of historicity as a requisite for a theory of 
liberation.  The discussion on Marcuse’s engagement with Heidegger follows.  
This part is important in understanding Marcuse because, in my opinion, it was 
his reading of Being and Time that led Marcuse to believe that the fight for 
liberation must begin within the “individual” himself and not from the 
politically indoctrinated “proletariat” of Marx. From here, the discussion 
proceeds to Marcuse’s appropriation of Hegel’s dialectic.  In his engagement 
with Heidegger, Marcuse realizes that Heidegger’s Dasein is both asocial and 
apolitical, thus the possibility of a radical action is nil.  Hegel’s dialectic fills this 
gap.  The progression of consciousness which results in a historically conscious 
individual exemplified by the “conscious slave” in Hegel’s discussion of 
master-slave relation provided Marcuse the basis of his claim that the 
individual can be an active and dynamic political subject.  The paper ends with 
a discussion on Marcuse’s re-appropriation of Marx. Re-appropriation because 
(and it must be noted) Marcuse’s pre-World War II writings are thematized by 
one recurring goal: the revitalization of Marxism.  Thus Marcuse’s reading of 
Lukacs, Heidegger, and Hegel is a Marxian reading.  It hopes to purge the kind 
T  
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of Marxism corrupted by the orthodox Marxists. In the end, through his 
engagement with Hegel’s “lordship and bondage” and Marx’s notion of 
“labor,” Marcuse arrives at a historically conscious individual who is disposed 
to radical political action. 
There is nothing more decisive in Marcuse’s pre-World War II writings 
than the notion of “historicity” for it is in the interpretation of this notion that 
he is able to develop his theory of liberation.  For Marcuse, historicity is that 
which “defines history and thus distinguishes it from ‘nature’ or from the 
‘economy’” and “signifies the meaning we intend when we say of something 
that is ‘historical’.”1  Historicity, therefore, should not be reduced to mere 
history as a science.  As that which defines history, which is commonly 
understood as the telling of a particular story or narration of events that 
happened in a specific time and place (that is, as historiography), historicity is 
the underlying principle of an event.  In other words, that which makes history 
“history” is historicity.  The form and characteristic of historicity as the 
principle of history is simply the happening or motility of the Being of the 
historical.  From here, it must be observed that historicity as the principle of 
history does not only refer to the Being of the historical, that is, Being as the 
subject of history per se, but historicity is nothing but the happening or the 
motility of the Being of beings as the subject of history.  Marcuse writes: “With 
respect to the historical, therefore, the problem is the manner in which it is.  
The question is not history as a science or as the object of a science but history 
as a mode of Being.”2  And he adds: “History will be our problem as a process 
of happening and as a form of motility.”3  But in what sense is the concept of 
historicity the principle of Marcuse’s theory of liberation?  The following 
discussion is entirely devoted to shed light on this question.  
It is necessary at this juncture to present the background of Marcuse’s 
conception of historicity as a requisite for the theory of liberation.  Marcuse 
returned to Berlin after completing his doctorate from the University of 
Freiburg in 1922.  During this time, Germany was still suffering from the 
socio-economic and political crisis engendered by the First World War.  Upset 
by the present crisis, Marcuse began his systematic study of Marx and was 
eventually attracted to the latter’s vehement critique of capitalism and the idea 
of socialist revolution as the best means to address such crisis.  However, the 
rise of Soviet Marxism, especially Stalinism, perturbed Marcuse’s hopeful 
reception of Marxism.  He became dissatisfied with the Soviet Marxists’ view 
of the “proletariat” as the only agent of the socialist revolution.  In addition, 
Marcuse believed that Marxism had come to an impasse because of its failure 
to provide theoretical guidance to the German socialists during and after their 
defeat in the November Revolution or the German Revolution of 1918-19.  As 
                                                 
1 Herbert Marcuse, Hegel’s Ontology and the Theory of Historicity, trans. by Seyla Benhabib 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England: The MIT Press, 1987), 1. 
2 Ibid.  
3 Ibid.  
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a result, Marcuse attempted to revitalize Marxism by looking for a corrective to 
this flaw somewhere else.4   
The first step Marcuse undertook was the reading of Georg Lukacs’s 
History and Class Consciousness published in 1923.  Here, Marcuse was impressed 
by Lukacs’s analysis of the reification of life under capitalism, that is, the 
reduction of man from active subject to inert object.  But Marcuse soon lost 
interest when Lukacs argued that it is only the “correct practical class 
consciousness of the proletariat” that can address the problem of reification.5   
Marcuse observes that Lukacs’s “correct class consciousness” is dangerous 
since this gives room for the vanguardist position of Vladimir I. Lenin, who 
argued that the workers must have a social democratic consciousness among 
themselves and this must be brought to them from the outside, from the 
educated members of the Socialist Party.6  But most importantly, Marcuse saw 
that Lukacs’s notion of “correct class consciousness” as the only means to 
address reification is flawed since those who “have not achieved this level of 
political and theoretical knowledge, who do not understand the social system 
from the class standpoint” are not inclined to radical action.7  Alluding to what 
Marx had argued in the Critique of the Gotha Program that the “dictatorship of the 
proletariat,” as a political condition, can only be resorted to only if there are no 
other ways to reach socialism as the first stage of communism,8 Marcuse 
argued that it is not the proletariat but the “concrete individual” regardless of 
class affiliation who can be the source of a genuine total social change.   
Patently, Marcuse by this time had already viewed the “concrete individual” as 
the active agent of social change.   
Marcuse read Heidegger’s Being and Time in 1927, the year of its 
publication.  According to Peter Lind, Marcuse was attracted by the 
questioning quality of Heidegger’s thought, his engagement, his ability to go 
beyond established norms and customs.9  M a rc u s e  s a w  a n  i o t a  o f h o p e i n  
Heidegger’s notion of “concrete philosophy” which aims at the salvation of the 
“concrete individual.”  However, Marcuse’s engagement with Heidegger does 
not suggest a break with Marx.  Rather, Marcuse’s reading of Heidegger’s Being 
and  Time, ironically, led to a re-appropriation and a more heightened 
understanding of Marx. Lind observes that “during the period 1929 to 1933, 
Marcuse was vividly interested and concerned with the idea of promoting a 
better understanding of Marx, radically different from that of mainstream 
                                                 
4 But towards the end of this section, it is argued that after all, Marcuse finds these 
“correctives” within Marx’s philosophy itself.   
5 Georg Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics, trans. by 
Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1968), 205. 
6 Vladimir I. Lenin, Marx, Engels, Marxism (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1970), 
138-139. 
7 See Morton Schoolman, The Imaginary Witness: The Critical Theory of Herbert Marcuse 
(New York: The Free Press, 1980), 9. 
8 Karl Marx, Critique of the Gotha Program, in  Marx and Engels: Basic Writings on Politics and 
Philosophy, Ed. by Lewis S. Feuer (New York: Collins, 1959), 169. 
9 Peter Lind, Marcuse and Freedom (London and Sydney: Croom Helm, 1985), 47.  
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Marxism….”10  This is exactly the reason why Marcuse turned to Heidegger 
rather than Lukacs in his attempt to correct orthodox Marxism, for what 
concerns Marcuse henceforth “which became the cornerstone of his thoughts 
throughout his life…was the emphasis on the concrete, universal individual as 
the subject of social and historical transformation.”11  Thus, in 1929, two years 
after he read Heidegger’s Being and Time, Marcuse decided to return to the 
University of Freiburg to study under Heidegger himself. 
What interests Marcuse in Heidegger is the notion of “inauthenticity” 
which lies at the heart of Being and Time.  Marcuse sees the notion of 
“inauthenticity” as the primordial problem that Heidegger passionately 
attempts to address.  To understand clearly the notion of “inauthenticity” and 
its connection to the theory of historicity, we must look briefly at Heidegger’s 
Being and Time. 
In Being and Time, Heidegger had undertaken to analyze the dynamics 
and structure of Being through the use of phenomenological ontology.  On the 
one hand, ontology for Heidegger means the theoretical inquiry which is 
explicitly devoted to the meaning of entities.12  On the other, phenomenology 
means “to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in 
which it shows itself from itself.”13  Thus the Heideggerian notion of 
phenomenology should not be understood in the literal sense, that is, 
phainomenon and logos, which literally means “study of things shown.”14  It must 
be viewed as the unconcealment of Being and Dasein’s appropriation of that 
which is unconcealed.   It is important to note that Heidegger puts more 
emphasis on phenomenology than the concept ontology for it is only through 
phenomenology that one “can have access to what is to be the theme of 
ontology….”15  Heidegger says that “only as phenomenology, is ontology 
possible.”16  And what Heidegger has in mind as that which shows itself in the 
phenomenological conception of “phenomenon” is the Being of entities, their 
meaning, their modifications and derivatives.17  Then Heidegger assigns human 
beings as the “subject” to be analyzed.  Heidegger writes: “We are ourselves 
the entities to be analyzed.  The Being of any such entity is in each case 
mine.”18  Inasmuch as ontology is possible only as phenomenology and that it 
is human beings who are the “subject” of this inquiry, it has now become clear 
that ontology is possible only as phenomenology of human existence.  Hence, 
it could be inferred that Heidegger’s phenomenological ontology is precisely 
                                                 
10 Lind, Marcuse and Freedom, 19. 
11 John Abromeit, “Herbert Marcuse’s Critical Encounter with Martin Heidegger 
1927-1933,” in Herbert Marcuse: A Critical Reader, John Abromeit and W. Mark Cobb, Eds. (New 
York and London: Routledge, 2004), 132.  
12 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, Trans. by John Macquarie and Edward Robinson 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978), 32  
13 Ibid., 58. 
14 David Macey, Dictionary of Critical Theory (London: Penguin Books, 2001), 297. 
15 Heidegger, Being and Time, 60.  
16 Heidegger, Being and Time, 60. 
17 Ibid.  
18 Ibid., 67.  
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“existential phenomenology,” that is, the analysis of the Being of human 
beings, and Heidegger calls human beings Dasein, meaning being-there.   
According to Heidegger, “…Dasein is an entity which in each case I myself 
am.”19 
If Dasein is being-there, then the question is where and how does it 
come to be there?  The result of Heidegger’s existential phenomenology as an 
inquiry into the Being of beings is that Dasein is being-there-in-the-world and 
that it has come to be in the world through “deliverance,” that is, 
“thrownness,” to use Heidegger’s jargon.  Heidegger declares that Dasein is 
“thrown” into the world and that being-in-the-world is a “thrownness.”  He 
writes: 
 
This characteristic of Dasein’s Being – this ‘that it is’ – is 
veiled in its ‘whence’ and ‘whither’, yet disclosed in itself 
all the more unveiledly; we call it the ‘thrownness’ of this 
entity into its ‘there’; indeed, it is thrown in such a way 
that, as Being-in-the-world, it is the ‘there’. The 
expression ‘thrownness’ is meant to suggest the facticity of 
its being delivered over.20 
 
For Heidegger, this “thrownness” into the world necessarily implies 
that Dasein always exists with other entities in the world and hence, as a being-
with-others-in-the-world, Dasein is entirely submerged in the immediate care 
and concern of the everyday world into which it is thrown.  Evidently, being-
with-others-in-the-world suggests that the existence of Dasein in the world is an 
existence with the “they” (das Man) or the anonymous anyone.  Thus, when 
Heidegger says that Dasein is submerged in the immediate care and concern of 
the everyday world into which it is thrown, this means that Dasein is constantly 
related to other human beings in the form of concern and care. The term 
“concern” for Heidegger is Dasein’s circumspective dealing with the ready-to-
hand-within-the-world, that is, with objects in the world.21 On the other hand, 
“care” is understood as Dasein’s act of expressing anything about itself to 
itself.22  Thus, “care” is not to be understood as an ethical category, that is, an 
“ought” on the part of Dasein to care for others.  It is rather an ontological 
category which is necessary for Dasein to become aware of its very own 
existence.  It must be observed at this point that for Heidegger “concern” must 
be understood in terms of the phenomenon of care because according to him, 
in one’s circumspective dealing with others, there is always a constant “care” as 
to the way one differs from them.23 What Heidegger would like to evince at 
                                                 
19 Ibid., 78. 
20 Heidegger, Being and Time, 74.  
21 Ibid., 157. 
22 Ibid., 227.   
23 Ibid., 163.  It is in “care” that the notion of “intersubjectivity” comes in.  Because in 
Dasein’s act of caring for the others, that is, human beings and other entities, Dasein eventually 
becomes aware of its very own existence.  
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this juncture is that through care, which implies the care of things and human 
beings, Dasein is fundamentally concerned about its mode of being, and hence 
becomes attuned to projecting its own possibility.  Through the modes of 
being, namely, being-with-other, having concern for others, and taking care of 
the world, Dasein becomes attuned to the world.  In this way, Dasein can now 
understand and transcend itself.   
Now, implicit in the idea of “care” are the dimensions of authentic and 
inauthentic existence.  According to Heidegger, Dasein’s everyday being-with-
one-another in the world stands in subjection, and thus its Being is taken away 
by the others.24  Having “delivered over,” Dasein has fallen into the “they,” 
Dasein’s existence becomes inauthentic.  Heidegger writes: 
 
“Fallenness” into the ‘world’ means an absorption in 
Being-with-one-another, in so far as the latter is guided by 
idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity.  Through the 
Interpretation of falling . . .  we have (now what we) 
called the inauthenticity of Dasein . . ..25 
 
Heidegger declares that Dasein is not aware of this inconspicuous 
domination by the others.  Dasein is not aware that its Being is controlled by 
the “they,” the anonymous anyone (das Man).  Thus, if Dasein is to be authentic 
it has to have full awareness of the significance of what it means “to be,” of 
what it means to be a self with others and objects in the world.26  Still, this 
requires the categories of guilt, conscience, and resoluteness.  Heidegger 
defines guilt as a “lack” within Dasein itself, something which ought to be there 
but is missing.27  In relation to Dasein’s Being, this lack is viewed as the “lack of 
authentic existence.”  In any case,   
Heidegger uses the term guilt to refer to Dasein’s “lostness in the they.”  In 
relative manner, conscience is the “call of care”; it “summons Dasein’s self from 
its lostness in the ‘they’.”28  As a “call of care,” conscience, therefore, is the 
inner voice of the intellect that calls Dasein to own his existence again.  If 
heeded, conscience will lead to resoluteness, that is, Dasein’s firm determination 
to own his existence again, to make its existence authentic. 
  If inauthenticity is understood as the fallenness of Dasein into the 
“they,” and that authenticity means full awareness of what it means to be a self 
with others and objects in the world, then this implies a “becoming,” that is, 
the realization of Dasein’s possibilities.  Authenticity, therefore, as the full 
                                                 
24 Heidegger, Being and Time, 164. 
25 Ibid., 220. Emphasis added.  Note that it is in the interconnectedness of idle talk, 
curiosity, and ambiguity that fallenness is revealed.  However, they are not necessary in this 
discussion.  What we are concerned here is the logic behind Heidegger’s existential 
phenomenology and its transition to Marcuse’s notion of historicity.  Nonetheless, skipping the 
discussion on these terms would not alter the logic of the whole inquiry. 
26 Barry Katz, Herbert Marcuse and the Art of Liberation: An Intellectual Biography (London: 
Verso, 1982), 68. 
27 Heidegger, Being and Time, 328. 
28 Ibid., 319.   
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awareness of the significance of what it means to be a self also means an 
“awareness of one’s own-most possibilities and the firm resolve to realize them 
in the future.”29  This shows that authenticity is always tied to one’s 
possibilities and to possible future ways of being, which makes manifest the 
“temporal” axis of the existential phenomenology—Dasein is in the present, 
indebted to the past, and oriented toward the future.30  In the final analysis, 
Heidegger’s existential phenomenology revealed that “to be” is “to be in time,” 
and “to be in time” is precisely “to be historical.” As Barry Katz puts it, 
“Historicity is the pivotal concept in Heidegger’s ontology, which refers to the 
way in which individuals proceed to self-awareness of the way they live in 
history.”31 He adds: “It comprehends the way in which individuals relate to 
their own past and appropriate the tradition of which they are a part.”32  This 
notion of historicity then becomes the central concept in Marcuse’s social 
theory.  Let us now turn to the discussion on Marcuse’s engagement with 
Heidegger and his re-appropriation of Marx via Hegel. 
  Marcuse’s engagement with Heidegger centers on the analysis of 
Dasein and the notion of historicity.  He recognizes in Heidegger the 
significance of the restoration of the individual’s concrete existence to the 
center of philosophy.  For sure, it was Heidegger’s existential phenomenology 
that provided Marcuse the revolutionary subject necessary for a radical 
transformation of the society, a decisive subject which Marxism failed to 
consider.  In an interview with Frederick Olafson in 1977, Marcuse says: “We 
saw in Heidegger what we had first seen in Husserl, a new beginning, the first 
radical attempt to put philosophy on really concrete foundations—philosophy 
concerned with the human existence, the human condition, and not merely 
with abstract ideas and principles.”33  But what interests Marcuse in Dasein, as 
the concrete existence of human beings, is the possibility of a “radical action” 
because that which is “concrete” is understood by Marcuse as the activity of 
the existential subject.34  And for Marcuse, “radical action” is deeply rooted in 
Dasein’s existence and is the hidden disposition of the individual to change and 
reshape the world he is thrown into.  This is a clear manifestation that Marcuse 
socializes Heidegger’s notion of care and concern precisely because “radical 
action” for Marcuse is simply man’s concern for the others and care of the 
world.  In his readings on Marcuse’s “Contribution to a Phenomenology of 
Historical Materialism,” Morton Schoolman observes that Marcuse makes 
public that which lies private in Heidegger’s notion of care and concern, that in 
this notion there lies an as yet unarticulated desire to create a space for the 
                                                 
29 Abromeit, Marcuse’s Critical Encounter, 135. 
30 Katz, Herbert Marcuse, 69. 
31 Ibid., 70. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Frederick Olafson, “Heidegger’s Politics (1977): An Interview with Herbert 
Marcuse, in The Essential Marcuse, Selected Writings of Philosopher and Social Critic Herbert Marcuse, 
Andrew Feenberg and William Leiss, Eds. (Boston: Beacon Press, 2007), 116. 
34 Andrew Feenberg, Heidegger and Marcuse: The Catastrophe and Redemption of History 
(New York and London: Routledge, 2005), 92.  
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unnamed but no less real human potentialities, and that within the deeper 
dimension of human existence there lies the secret ambition to change the 
world.35  From here, one can notice that Marcuse no longer considers Marx’s 
proletariat as the factor of “radical action” but it is now the ordinary individual.  
The struggle against oppression now rests on the concrete individual and must 
begin from him.   
But how is “radical action” possible?  Or if “radical action” is deeply 
rooted in the individual himself and is lying there as an unarticulated 
disposition, how can the individual unleash and realize this possibility?  First, 
“radical action” is a necessary reaction to the reality of oppression in the 
society.  And second, that this oppression leads to inauthentic existence, 
“radical action,” therefore, is an “ought” on the part of Dasein, an inner urge to 
resist this kind of oppression.  However, the realization of “radical action” 
presupposes a kind of knowledge that would make the individual act.  And this 
knowledge is always historical because it is derived from the concrete 
situations.  Thus, for Marcuse, an awareness of historicity is the precondition 
of “radical action” because an adequate grasp of the concrete situations 
necessitates a thorough comprehension of historicity.36 
Now in Being and Time, Heidegger understood the Being and essence of 
Dasein historically, and that Dasein is a historical being because it is temporal.  
And since temporality is regarded by Heidegger as the meaning of Dasein’s 
totality, then, again, it is the awareness of historicity that makes authentic 
existence possible.37  According to Alfred Schmidt, the hidden ground of 
historicity in Being and Time is authentic being toward death, that is, the 
temporality of Dasein which extends between birth and death.38  But what is 
crucial at this point is Heidegger’s proclamation that the historical Dasein is a 
powerless subject of history.  For Heidegger, according to Werner Marx, Dasein 
must surely be thought historically but in such a way that any given change 
would not depend upon the power of man, even though a certain role in the 
occurrence seems to be due to man himself.39  And, for Heidegger, part of 
being authentic is the acceptance of “dejection” as Dasein’s fateful destiny, 
which implies that Dasein must accept his being delivered into his own 
existence and into the world, and that Dasein must accept the heritage of the 
past, assume it and work from there toward his very own destiny.40  But for 
Marcuse, authentic existence is not merely the acceptance of dejection; rather, 
it is a return to the past and opposes to the factual present the better of the 
                                                 
35 Schoolman, Imaginary Witness, 12. 
36 See Lind, Marcuse and Freedom, 51. 
37 Heidegger, Being and Timee, 425. 
38 Alfred Schmidt, “Existential Ontology and Historical Materialism in the work of 
Herbert Marcuse,” in Marcuse: Critical Theory and the Promise of Utopia, Robert Pippin, Andrew 
Feenberg, Charles P. Webel, and Contributors, Eds. (Massachusetts: Bergin and Garvey 
Publishers, 1988), 50. 
39 Werner Marx, Heidegger and Tradition, trans. by Theodore Kisiel and Murray Greene 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1971), 163. 
40 Lind, Marcuse and Freedom, 61.  
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past.41  T h i s  i s  t h e  e s s e n c e  o f  Dasein as a concerned being.  In addition, 
Marcuse also rejects Heidegger’s claim that authentic existence can be attained 
through the “practical” concern for one’s own existence as the key to well-
understood freedom.  In this sense, it can be argued that Heidegger’s solution 
to the problem of inauthenticity is based on the solitary existence that would 
lead to self-awareness.  But for Marcuse, the solution to inauthenticity 
(reification in Lukacs’s terminology) is a “radical action,” which will eventually 
lead to collective radical action.  Thus, according to Marcuse, in discovering the 
authentic historical existence made possible by the notion of concern (for 
others) and full knowledge of concrete historical situations, the individual 
becomes disposed to radical action that will finally lead to a collective radical 
action to change and reshape the sick society.42  It is in this claim that Marcuse 
departs from Heidegger. 
Having turned Heidegger’s Dasein inside out, having politicized Dasein, 
Marcuse’s next concern is to explain the practicability of a “collective radical 
action.”  If Heidegger’s Dasein is a passive being, and if concrete existence for 
Marcuse means having a disposition for radical action, then it must be 
explained once and for all how and under what condition the individual 
becomes capable of such a radical act. This issue is precisely the motif of 
Marcuse’s Hegel’s Ontology and the Theory of Historicity.  As Morton Schoolman 
maintains, the main purpose of Hegel’s Ontology is to establish the fact that the 
author of existence is an active and dynamic subject, a reflective subject, that 
reflection is a continual movement from one stage to the other, and each stage, 
though originally authored by the subject, places limitations upon the 
subsequent stage to which the subject can aspire.43 
Hegel’s Ontology is divided into two major parts; the first deals with 
Hegel’s  Logic and the second with Hegel’s Phenomenology.  Marcuse’s 
interpretation of Hegel’s Logic is not aimed at a complete understanding of the 
work; rather, it is focused on the theme that concerns the unfolding of the 
concept of Being and the process of happening implied in it.  Here, the 
concept “dialectic” takes center stage.  The point Marcuse wants to convey in 
his interpretation of Hegel’s Logic is that all things are incessantly in the act of 
becoming, and negativity is the underlying principle.  In Hegel’s dialectic, the 
thesis Being is transformed into its antithesis non-Being through the process of 
negation; inevitably, the antithesis non-Being (Nothing) which is deduced from 
the thesis Being is then again negated which leads to the third category, namely, 
Becoming.44  As Marcuse writes: “All being is a having become . . . and a 
becoming . . . of another being.  All being is related to an unending multiplicity 
of other beings through its origins, and springing forth out of its origins . . . , it 
                                                 
41 Ibid. 
42 Lind, Marcuse and Freedom, 65. 
43 Schoolman, The Imaginary Witness, 17. 
44 Samuel Enoch Stumpf, Philosophy: History and Problems, 5th ed. (New York: McGraw-
Hill, 1994), 333.   
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re-enters a new manifold.”45  According to Hegel, this is the “very nature and 
essence of everything . . . the law of things and of the finite as a whole.”46   
For Marcuse, as for Hegel, this movement is not directionless because 
it is guided by the idea of “motility,” defined as the Being that comprehends, 
which aims at the purest actualization of Being.47  The dialectic, therefore, is a 
kind of movement that purifies Being through a series of negations until it 
reaches what Hegel calls the Absolute Idea.  Thus, the Being in the very 
beginning which undergoes multiple changes is the same Being that reaches 
purity; it is the Being that has been in the past, is in the present, and will be in 
the future.  According to Marcuse, this movement is characterized by the idea 
of unity in multiplicity, that is, identity in difference.   
In Hegel’s dialectic, Marcuse explains that in the beginning is the idea 
of original unity or the absolute totality.  This absolute totality is the true unity 
which must be understood as the meaning of Being.  Thus for Hegel, the 
notions “original unity,” “absolute totality,” and “Being” are one and the same.  
The absolute totality, which is the origin of being, allows being to spring forth 
out of itself, and as the original unity, it first gives unity over and against all 
opposites.48  Thus, the absolute as totality is not to be understood as the sum 
total of all things; it is simply that which constitutes the proper being of all that 
exists.  The absolute is the Being which lies at the ground of all beings, which is 
present in them and which gives unity among them.49  In other words, the 
absolute is the underlying principle of all that exists.  Now, it should be 
remembered that Hegel’s goal which is the Absolute Idea is no different from 
the absolute totality which exists from the very beginning of the dialectic.  For 
Hegel, the process of the purification of Being which lies at the heart of the 
dialectic is actually a returning back to the original unity; it is precisely a process 
of going back to itself, to its original and purest form. This means that the 
Absolute Idea or “original unity” was there from the very start but has 
regressed.  Thus, the dialectic, which is the history of the progression of 
consciousness, is a process of attaining the ideal state (the Absolute) through 
recollection or remembrance of the things past, through remembrance of the 
“original unity.”  To understand this clearly, this needs an investigation of the 
unfolding of Being in the dialectical process itself. 
The absolute as totality contains within itself the manifold of 
bifurcation.  Bifurcation is the juxtaposition of beings within the totality of the 
absolute—the opposites of spirit and matter, soul and body, faith and 
understanding, freedom and necessity, being and not-being, concept and being, 
                                                 
45 Marcuse, Hegel’s Ontology, 11. 
46 Georg W. F. Hegel, Hegel’s Logic, translated from the Encyclopaedia of Philosophical 
Sciences by William Wallace (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 116. 
47 Marcuse, Hegel’s Ontology, 4.  Though Marcuse buys Hegel’s dialectic, it must be 
noted that like Adorno, and the rest of the first generation of Critical Theorists, Marcuse does 
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48 Ibid., 22.  
49 Marcuse, Hegel’s Ontology, 22.  
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finitude and infinity.50  In general, bifurcation is the juxtaposition of 
subjectivity and objectivity, a juxtaposition which is at the same time a unity in 
itself.  Being inherent in the absolute itself, bifurcation is thus the original unity 
which allows the world of oppositions and limitations to spring forth from 
itself.  In essence, bifurcation is simply the self-positing or the appearing of the 
absolute, and this is necessary on the part of the absolute because its primary 
function is to manifest itself; it is this specific motion of bringing itself forth, of 
showing itself, which constitutes the proper “actuality” of beings.51  H e g e l  
equated bifurcation with self-positing or appearing because when the absolute 
posits itself, it posits itself in duality.  That is, when something exists or 
appears, it makes itself the opposite of anything else.  For example, once a 
chair exists (appears), it becomes distinct from the rest of all things; it becomes 
the opposite of all things that are not identical to itself.  In other words, the 
existence of a thing is a necessary negation of all things; the chair is a negation 
of the table, the room, the tree, just as they are a negation of the chair.  This 
bifurcation, this fundamental split and dual character of reality, according to 
Marcuse, is the ground of the motility of Being—Being becomes a motility, it 
becomes a happening because it bifurcates itself, it manifests itself, that is, it 
makes itself “actual.”  Nonetheless, there is identity in this difference because 
the chair is a chair only if it is juxtaposed with the table, tree or room.  Hegel 
calls this identity in difference or absolute unity Absolute Idea, the conscious 
identity of the finite and the infinite, that is, the unification of opposites; the 
Absolute Idea is the actual being in its highest truth.52  But Marcuse argues that 
Being comes first to its truth as Idea, then Life, the Being of humans, moves to 
the center of ontology, and, finally, the Absolute Idea becomes actual.53  In 
conclusion, the dialectical process which starts from the absolute or the 
original unity of subjectivity and objectivity, which then manifests itself from 
itself and negates itself through bifurcation, and then transforms itself by way 
of regression, and finally reaches a completion in the Absolute Idea is nothing 
than the “history of beings.”  Indeed, the dialectic is precisely the history of 
beings out of which Life emerges.  In the first part of Hegel’s Ontology, Marcuse 
arrives at the following conclusions: 
 
1)  The thesis that the meaning of Being consists in the original unity of 
subjectivity…and objectivity…and the formulation of this unity as a 
process of development of beings themselves…dissolves traditional 
ontology into a history of beings.  The different regions of beings then 
unfold as varied forms of a processual happenings; 
 
2)  Because beings are understood as structures of unifying unity in 
movement, the dimension of essence is disclosed as the actual having-
once been, as the timeless past, of beings.  Their having-been is a 
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decisive factor in the history of beings.  It is this dimension which first 
allows the unity of the process of becoming of beings as independent 
selves in otherness.  The dimension of having-been gives the unity of 
this “ground” and its identity.  The dimension of essence is where 
beings retreat from their immediate presence back into themselves; it 
is in the sphere of mediation wherein beings grasp their present 
existence (Dasein) as a presupposition of their essence, and through 
their essence transform it into “posited being.”  Mediation, 
presupposition, and posited being will later prove themselves as the 
essentially historical categories of Hegelian ontology; a being that 
exists in this fashion is a historical one; 
 
3)  The history of beings is directed from within toward an immanent 
goal: it reaches completion in the freedom and truth of a being that 
comprehends, in the Being of the Idea. Beings come first to their truth 
as Idea; only as Idea is their process a true one.  With this claim, 
however, the Being of humans, Life itself, moves to the center of 
ontology.  For Life is the first form in which concept is realized in its 
truth and freedom, and in which the Idea of Being has become actual.  
First with the being of Life do all entities grasped by Life become 
actual and manifest their truth.54 
 
As mentioned, Marcuse’s engagement with Hegel’s Logic is concerned 
mainly with the unfolding of Being; it shows that the dialectical process in itself 
is nothing but the history of Life.  Also in the Logic, Marcuse has only 
considered the reality of Life in a more general sense; Life is not yet analyzed in 
its total concreteness.  Thus, the question regarding the condition which makes 
the individual capable of radical action is not yet fully addressed.  But as 
expected, this issue preoccupies Marcuse in the second part of Hegel’s Ontology.  
Marcuse’s engagement with Hegel now moves from the Logic to the 
Phenomenology, from a general conception of Life to the concrete and specific 
way of human life. 
  Life is introduced as self-consciousness in Hegel’s Phenomenology and, 
just as in the Logic, Life in the Phenomenology is considered as a process, but this 
time a process which results in a concrete knowing “I,” the individual.  In the 
process of individuation, self-consciousness begins with “desire.”  In fact, 
Hegel declares that desire is in itself self-consciousness.55  Desire, however, 
should not be understood in the psychological sense as a craving for something 
that satisfies physiological needs.  Desire for Hegel simply means the original 
attitude of the “I” toward self-consciousness.  In other words, desire is the 
necessary tendency of the knowing “I” to make itself actual; it is indeed the 
necessary self-showing of the knowing “I.”  The satisfaction of this desire is 
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precisely the fulfillment of the actual Being of the “I,” but this can only be 
attained through a dialectical interaction with another conscious self.   
According to Hegel, self-consciousness exists in itself and for itself only by 
being recognized by the other conscious self, thus Hegel’s theory of 
recognition.56  For Marcuse, this process is a “we-like” process of Life, and, in 
here, there is an essential reciprocal dependence, there is an essential demand 
for reciprocal recognition.57 
  With the “we-like” process of Life, Marcuse realizes that human life is 
basically a struggle for self-subsistence, for freedom.  He says that the essence 
of self-consciousness is freedom.58  This can be fully grasped through Hegel’s 
idea of dependence and independence exemplified by master-slave relationship. 
  In the master and slave relation, the master has not recognized the 
slave as an essentially independent being because at first, the master thinks of 
himself as the only independent being.  But when the master achieved real 
lordship he realizes that he has achieved not independent consciousness but a 
dependent one.  The master realizes that he is dependent upon his subject, 
upon the slave;59 he is totally dependent upon the toil of the slave.  On the 
other side, the slave, who in the beginning views his plight as legitimate, also 
realizes that he is truly independent and it is the master that depends upon him, 
especially on the fruits of his labor.60  Thus, it is through labor that the slave 
realizes that he is truly free.  But this does not mean that the slave automatically 
becomes “free” upon realizing via the notion of labor that it is him and not the 
master who is truly free.  After all, he is still a slave.  The slave still needs to 
fight for his freedom. 
  Marcuse sees labor therefore as the principle of freedom.  This is now 
the most crucial point of Marcuse’s engagement with Hegel and as an answer 
to the question posed earlier: through labor, the individual attains a level of 
concrete consciousness that would make him disposed to radical action.   
Inasmuch as this realization is viewed as the result of the movement of Life, 
that is, as history, the claim that Marcuse’s theory of historicity as his first 
theory of liberation is given a sound grounding; the abstract notion of 
“historicity” becomes concrete with the idea of “self-consciousness,” which 
can dispense the individual the necessary insight for radical action. Another 
important implication that could be drawn from Marcuse’s Hegel’s Ontology is 
that this self-consciousness, which, again and again, makes the individual 
disposed to radical action, results in a necessary union between theory and 
praxis.  Self-consciousness viewed by Hegel as Absolute Spirit is now taken by 
Marcuse to mean a “knowledge that acts and action that knows.”  Finally, 
Marcuse’s appropriation of Hegel reveals clearly his tacit break with Heidegger 
even before the latter publicly declares his pro-Nazi leanings. Heidegger’s 
Dasein is predetermined by the a priori elements of experience.  Dasein needs to 
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accept its dejection and work from there.  Dasein must attune itself to Being 
and appropriate that which is unconcealed by Being itself.  For Heidegger, this 
is the way to authenticity, to Dasein’s act of attaining authenticity.  But with his 
analysis and appropriation of Hegel, Marcuse insists that the determination of 
radical action is not something imposed upon the individual from without; 
rather, it is expressed by the individual from within.  The individual is not 
determined by some pre-given elements of experience or “existential givens” as 
Heidegger would have us believe.  On the contrary, Marcuse argues that it is 
the individual that creates not only his own existence but the subjective and 
objective determinants of this existence.  In other words, it is the individual 
that shapes society and it is the same individual that moves history, and that 
“dejection” is a social and historical construction.  In addition, Marcuse argues 
that Hegel’s subject is freer than Heidegger’s Dasein and that Hegel’s subject 
does not engage in practical activity without first of all attaining a theoretical 
knowledge which is closely tied to the social and political life.61  It is in Hegel’s 
philosophy, therefore, that Marcuse’s theory of historicity achieves a level of 
concreteness and not in Heidegger’s existential ontology.   
  Time and again, it must be remembered that from the very outset 
Marcuse never intended himself to become a disciple of Heidegger. He studied 
Heidegger in order to revitalize Marxism.  Heidegger’s influence on Marcuse 
therefore is no more than a mere inspiration or simply a guide to what the 
latter had been looking for.  This became evident when Marcuse cast off 
Heidegger after reading the newly published Economic and Philosophical 
Manuscripts of 1844.  In these manuscripts, Marcuse realized that the correctives 
to orthodox Marxism were actually lying at the very heart of Marx’s 
philosophy.  Via Hegel’s notion of labor, the discovery of the Paris 
Manuscripts enabled Marcuse to finally lay down his first theory of human 
liberation without the help of Heidegger’s existential phenomenology.  The 
attempt to fuse Heidegger’s existential philosophy and Marx’s socialism had 
been abandoned and Marcuse’s theory of historicity was now focused on 
Marx’s notion of labor.  The next discussion deals with Marcuse’s re-
engagement with Marx. 
  Marcuse insists that the manuscripts called for a re-interpretation of 
the meaning of the theory of historical materialism.  Contrary to previous 
claims that the theory is rooted in purely economic grounds, that “history 
develops according to rigid economic laws that establish socialism as its 
necessary and inevitable outcome,”62 Marcuse argues that Marx’s historical 
materialism is a history of the active individual making himself free through 
labor; economics is not the end, but rather the means to the realization of 
man’s potentialities.  “Far from being mere economic activity…, labor is the 
‘existential activity’ of man, his ‘free conscious activity’—not a means for 
maintaining his life…but for developing his ‘universal nature’.63   
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  For Marcuse, as for Marx, labor is man’s affirmation of his being 
because through labor, man can produce and reproduce an external, material 
objective world.64  Through labor, man is able to transform and appropriate the 
material objects he encounters to satisfy his needs, a satisfaction necessary for 
the full realization of his potentialities and his becoming a truly free being.  Put 
differently, labor is man’s act of perfecting himself.  It appears therefore that 
labor is man’s essence; it defines himself as conscious being distinct from the 
brutes.  Thus, in producing and reproducing the objective world to his 
advantage, 
 
man proves himself a conscious species being, i.e., as a 
being that treats the species as its own essential being, or 
treats himself as a species being.  Admittedly, animals also 
produce.  They build nests, dwellings, like the bees, 
beavers, ants, etc.  But an animal only produces what it 
immediately needs for itself or its young.  It produces 
one-sidedly, whilst man produces universally.  It produces 
only under the dominion of immediate physical need, 
whilst man produces even when he is free from physical 
need and only truly produces in freedom therefrom.  An 
animal produces only itself, whilst man produces the 
whole of nature.  An animal’s product belongs 
immediately to its physical body, whilst man freely 
confronts his product.  An animal forms things in 
accordance with the standard and the need of the species 
to which it belongs, whilst man knows how to produce in 
accordance with the standard of every species, and knows 
how to apply everywhere the inherent standard to the 
object.  Man therefore also forms things in accordance 
with the laws of beauty. 
          It is just in his work upon the objective world, 
therefore, that man first really proves himself to be a 
species being.  This production is his active species life.   
Through and because of this production, nature appears 
as  his work and his reality.  The object of labor is, 
therefore, the objectification of man’s species life: for he 
duplicates himself not only, as in consciousness, 
intellectually, but also actively, in reality, and therefore 
contemplates himself in a world that he has created.65 
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  But the realization of the goal of labor is not as easy as it seems to be.  
Because the individual is social by nature, his labor cannot escape the 
systematic organization of labor in society, which always involves the system of 
control and domination.  This is true in a capitalist society.  Under capitalism, 
all aspects of the labor process, for example, what are and how much to be 
produced, how are prices and wages to be determined, and things like these, 
are solely determined by the capitalist themselves.  Marx rightly puts it that the 
sole motive of the capitalist is nothing but the consideration of his own profit.  
The role of capital and profit is crucial here.  Marx is convinced that the 
employment of capital is intended solely for the acquisition of more and more 
profits and not for the benefit of the whole society.  He sees that the “plans 
and speculations of the employers of capital regulate and direct all the most 
important operations of labor, and profit is the end proposed by all those plans 
and projects.”66   
The obstruction of the goal of labor is explained fully in the notion 
“alienation of labor.”  Man’s act of perfecting himself through labor is deterred 
since under capitalism, the fruit of his labor is no longer his own but possessed 
and manipulated by the other, the capitalist; the product of his labor becomes 
an independent object existing outside himself, a powerful object that 
confronts him.  This is the alienation of man from himself as a result of being 
alienated from the fruits of his labor.  But inasmuch as man becomes his true 
self only if he is related to another self, then man’s alienation from himself is at 
the same time an alienation from his fellowmen.  Marcuse observes that 
alienation of labor in general has set individuals in society against each other.  
“They are linked in the commodities they exchange rather than their 
persons.”67  What is worst is that the individuals themselves are reduced to the 
level of commodities.  “Labor produces not only commodities: it produces 
itself and the workers as a commodity….”68   
Alienation of labor in general is characterized by the fact that labor 
under capitalism makes the worker discontent and unhappy.  This is because 
every time the worker labors for the capitalist, and since the latter has no other 
interest than the accumulation of more profits, the poorer he becomes.  This 
follows the law of inverse proportion in the accumulation of profit and the 
compensation of the workers: the more the capitalist maximizes profit, the 
more wage is minimized.  Alienation of labor therefore necessarily implies 
pauperization.  With this condition, the worker “does not develop freely his 
physical and mental energy but mortifies his body and ruins his mind.”69  His 
labor therefore is not voluntary but coerced; it is indeed forced labor.  Under 
capitalism, the worker is not free.  He only “feels himself freely active in his 
animal function—eating, drinking, procreating, or at the most in his dwelling 
and in dressing-up, etc.; and in his human functions he no longer feels himself 
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to be anything but an animal.  What is animal becomes human and what is 
human becomes animal.”70 
  Alienation of labor is concretely manifested in “private property.”   
Marx believes that it is private property that completes the dominion over man.  
Thus, Marx’s solution to the problem of alienation of labor is not the abolition 
of labor per se, but the total abolition of private property.  However, it is a 
mistake to view the abolition of private property as the abolition of the fruits 
of man’s labor.  In the Communist Manifesto, Marx clearly states that there is no 
need to abolish the hard-won, self-acquired private property of the individual.71  
The individual finds satisfaction in this property, and through this, he is able to 
proceed to perfecting himself.  So, when Marx called for the abolition of 
private property, he meant the bourgeois private property.  It is the 
institutionalized bourgeois private property or “capital,” which exploits the 
laborer that must be abolished.   
  For Marx, according to Marcuse, there are two forms of private 
property, namely: 1) estranged private property, and 2) true form of private 
property.  The first is merely private property, that which is the result of the 
capitalist mode of appropriation.  Marcuse opines that this form of private 
property consists in an untrue mode of having and possessing and its use is 
based either in immediate consumption or in its capacity to be turned into 
capital.72  Here, life stands in the service of property instead of property in the 
service of life.73  True form of private property on the other hand is simply 
those objects whose availability and usability enable the free realization of 
man’s essence, that which enriches and completes his entire being.   This does 
not mean, however, that man simply and directly has to have and possess 
them; man needs to appropriate them through labor.  True private property, 
therefore, implies that the product of man’s labor becomes an integral part of 
his nature. In this way, labor is no longer an alienated activity, but all-around 
self-realization and self-expression.74  Marcuse argues that this is the way to the 
emancipation of man, or, in Marx’s words, the realization of the “total man.” 
  With Marx’s notion of labor, Marcuse’s theory of historicity as a 
theory of liberation is now arrived at.  Labor as a practical activity is not merely 
instrumental, i.e., as means to an end, as means to self-development and self-
creation, but a reflective activity that makes the individual “historically 
conscious” and enables him to transform nature to his advantage.  Labor 
produces in man “insight,” that is, an understanding into the historical and 
social situation, a real knowledge of the structure and operations of the entire 
social system.  For Marcuse, this “insight” makes the individual disposed to 
radical action, and thus enables him to oppose and abolish all forms of control 
and domination.  Through labor, man becomes the lever of the revolution. 
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  In the final analysis, Marcuse’s theory of historicity shows that the 
individual is the key agent of the revolution and it is not the “correct class 
consciousness” of the proletariat as Marx, and later Lukacs, would have us 
believe.   It is not even the apolitical and solitary Dasein of Heidegger.  Through 
his engagement with Hegel’s “lordship and bondage” and Marx’s notion of 
“labor,” Marcuse arrives at a historically conscious individual who is disposed 
to radical political action.  As Morton Schoolman opines, Marcuse’s theory of 
historicity as a theory of liberation constituted the recognition of the radical 
individual as a viable political unit, as the hope of the revolution.75 
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